Theory of Truth

December 11, 2018

 

Pragmatism is often described as a theory of truth because, at its core, Pragmatism is concerned with the meaning and nature of truth. As Pragmatist philosophers, Peirce, James, and Dewey all incorporated the scientific method of experience into their theories of truth. However, distinctive from Peirce's approach, James’ theory of significance and Dewey’s pattern of inquiry provides methods of truth that consider one’s relations to the environment. James and Dewey also differ from Peirce’s idea of truth by accepting the plurality and dynamicity of it, as opposed to believing in a stable and universal truth as Peirce posits. Furthermore, Peirce’s theory of inquiry does not fully address the concept of subjectivity. While they both offer a more dynamic characterization of truth, Dewey’s theory does not account for subjectivity as James does. In this philosophy paper on Pragmatism, I'd like to assess the ideas of truth offered by three, arguably the most prominent, Pragmatist philosophers. 

 

Pragmatism gauges the value of a true belief in “experiential terms” (228) as they seek to determine the “concrete difference its being true make in any one’s actual life” (228). Therefore, truth is under the “double influence” (239) of facts and experience. Herein lies the main difference between the rationalism, which was the dominating thought at the time, and pragmatism: while rationalists accept that “experience is in mutation”, they reject the idea that “reality (…) or truth itself is mutable” (240). In a rational stance, reality stands “complete and ready-made from all eternity” (240). This form of truth has no affinity to our experiences and neglects our practical interests and personal reasons. Pragmatists oppose this perception that the world is “complete” and therefore impervious to the effects of choice. They reject the idea of “foundational beliefs” that all knowledge could appeal to, like the “fundamental truths” present in rationalist principles. Pragmatism suggests beliefs and methods of inquiry be grounded in experience as well as their consequences and usefulness in achieving human goals. Peirce first introduced the pragmatist theory of truth by introducing the unavoidable role of experience in our establishment of beliefs and determination of truth. The experience of error leads to doubt, which is “an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves from” (66). Therefore, the act of thought is instigated by this irritation of doubt and “ceases when belief is attained” (83). To Peirce, belief is established through a process of inquiry, which only ends with “the settlement of opinion” (67). That opinion which is eventually arrived at is truth.

 

A critique of Peirce’s concept of truth is that is relatively static and does not consider the environmental context or personal interests. While he does not go as far as claiming the world is absolutely certain or incorrigible like the Cartesians, Peirce does believe the truth, once determined, is unique and absolute. In Peirce’s view, truth is the eventual convergence of any inquiry “carried sufficiently far” (98). This concept posits that truth is “the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate” (97). Even if there appears to be disputes at the beginning of this investigation for truth, the disparate minds will inevitably and uncontrollably converge at a steady point of accord. To Peirce, there is one destined conclusion, and it is the single universal truth. However, can such a definition of truth even hold in Peirce’s own model of inquiry? If the establishment of belief involves endless iterations of doubt and inquiry as new information arise, how would the same opinion come to prevail as truth? As the context of information and environment of the object shift, the logical process that settles an opinion would necessarily shift accordingly too. Shouldn’t a different “truth” come to be depending on the situation? James and Dewey address this concern by offering a more dynamic take on the concept of truth, one that accepts its kinetic plurality.

 

James and Dewey propose conceptual systems in which equally justifiable and reliable results exist, and the choice between them are interest-dependent. First, let’s discuss James’ approach. James acknowledges the possibility for many “truths” (or resulting systems) considering underdetermination (when there is insufficient evidence to identify which belief to hold from that evidence). From there, he defines truth as the “agreement (…) with reality” (227) and the acquisition of these true beliefs requires “verification”. Unlike Peirce’s theory which is solely dependent on inquiry (or “verification), James’s process also includes the exercise of interest, purposes and values. This supports his view of how truth “is not a stagnant property inherent in [an idea]” (229) but a phenomenon that happens to an idea.” In other words, an idea is made true by events. It involves, in addition to inquiry, a dependence on the object’s interactions with the environment. James identifies 3 object-oriented constraints that dictate whether a new belief should be taken for consideration of truth. First, it’s “direct face to face verification” (231), then there’s truths “in advance of special verification” (233), and the stock of truths “already in our possession” (233). These “coercions” causes our mind to be “wedged tightly” (233) and pressure our objective control of belief-establishment operations. Dewey takes the participation of action and environment even further than James by asserting a structure of thought that is “not merely [a] ‘mental’ process” (321). He believes the “restoration of integration” (321) is based on situational guidance, and that inquiry is a behavior triggered by external factors (317). Dewey integrates Peirce and James’ ideologies into a new basis where “existence of inquiry is not a matter of doubt” (317) but is instead an environment that is both organic and interactive. This means that instead of Peirce’s belief that inquiry begins with doubt and ends with the arrival at a final opinion, Dewey considers the source of inquiry to be the organic interaction between “environing conditions” and the examination of all their “potentialities” (322). Dewey selects out of these plausible solutions to an inquiry based on the consequences and practical impacts they have. These factors are perpetually changing and therefore the “resolution to [an] indeterminate situation” is similarly “active and operational” (322).

 

Another cavity in Peirce’s view on truth is its lack of account for human subjectivity. Since Peirce defines the real as “that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be” (95), Peirce’s perspective of truth considers a reality that is independent of human cognition and therefore omits any form of subjective qualities. Critics of his perspective on truth have challenged with the concept of consciousness, a phenomenon occurring in the minds, which supposedly makes real a thought by the act of thinking it. If his theory of inquiry is contingent on a “settlement of opinions”, how could he exclude the consideration of human subjectivity which is the basis of all opinions? We have thus far shown how James and Dewey’s concept of truth is superior to Peirce’s by incorporating environmental factors and personal interests. Now, let’s compare James and Dewey using the question: does subjectivity have a place in pragmatist theories of truth? Before discussing how each of their philosophy may or may not answer that question, let’s first explore a main difference between James and Dewey.

 

Both James and Dewey depict belief and its determination process as dynamic and conditional on the environment. Even more so, they are concerned with the practicality of an idea. James classifies this concern in terms of an idea’s expediency. Referring back to his theory of value-dependence in the choice of beliefs, truth is only based on a need, practically situated and calculated based on clear standards.  Therefore, to James the value of truth is “primarily derived from the practical importance of their object to us” (230) which forms a “jungle of concrete expediencies” (243). An idea is true if it is verified, but it only becomes useful if it’s served a function in experience. Dewey holds a similar belief in how the “effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence (…) in our practical experience” (27). However, Dewey defines this “experience” in a particular way, specifically “it must be active” (27). Therein lies the main difference between James and Dewey. James’ model posits that different beliefs are “distinguished by the different modes of actions to which they give rise” (85). The pragmatism as conceived by James (and Peirce) asserts that “the function of thought is to produce habits of action” (87). On the contrary, Dewey believes the “role of action is that of an intermediary” (25). In order to bestow meaning to concepts, one must be able to apply them to existence, and it is only through action that this application is made possible. Simply put, they draw an opposite causal relationship between action and meaning-making of beliefs. James believes meaning comes first then leads to habits of action; Dewey suggests that action is an evidence that proceeds to contribute meaning to beliefs.

 

I’d like to argue that James’ approach to meaning and truth is more applicable for subjectivity. While both James and Dewey’s frameworks offer a more significant role for human choice and initiative in the establishment of belief and truth, James’ perspective fully allows for human subjectivity as it begins with meaning and provides access to action. James’ model of new belief creation relies on how new opinion “gratifies the individual’s desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock” (218). It relies on both alignment with old truth and integration of the new fact. This means, the validity of truthfulness is a matter of individual appreciation. Therefore “it is for subjective reasons” (218) that new truths are born. Dewey’s approach considers any cognitive development or learning as the result of an “interaction in an environment” and an exchange of “undergoing and acting”. This indicates that since the designation of meaning to beliefs is a cognitive process, it could not have taken place without first acquiring information through experience. Therefore, this could only result in situations where observable and objective experience— based on actions— change values, and not vice versa. This demonstrates that not only does James’ model have a more pluralistic view on truth and a more comprehensive consideration of environmental and personal influences than Peirce’s theories, it also accounts for human subjectivity which Dewey’s approach does not.

 

In conclusion, while Peirce, James and Dewey all share distinct characteristics of pragmatism in their philosophies, they still vary in terms of the process of establishing beliefs and determining truth, as well as its applications in practicality and personal interests. While Peirce’s theory of inquiry offers a system that integrates both facts and experience into the development of truths, its focus on a universal truth is flawed in situational and subjective conditions. Dewey’s process of inquiry incorporates both Peirce and James’ ideas into an organic and interactive system of inquiry. James similarly associates the verification of a belief with individual interests and its expediency. However, James and Dewey deviate from each other’s philosophy when it comes to the causal relationship between action and meaning. Dewey’s approach requires experiential evidence in terms of actions to bestow meaning upon beliefs. James’ method ascertains the meaning first, then produces habits of action. Furthermore, Dewey’s mode of thought does not account for the consideration of subjectivity in the pragmatist theories of truth. James’ concept offers a place for subjectivity in the appreciation and selection of truths. Therefore, James’ perspective is superior out of the three pragmatists’ views.

 

Citation:

Thayer, H. S. (1989). Pragmatism, the classic writings. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub.